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April 2025 Safety Bulletin "No Detection: Explosion at Watson Grinding"

Writer: NEBULA SAFETY
NEBULA SAFETY
Apr 1, 2025
3 min read

Updated: Aug 31

On January 24, 2020, an accidental propylene release caused a catastrophic explosion at Watson Grinding and Manufacturing in Houston, Texas. Two employees were fatally injured, two other employees were injured, and a nearby resident later died from injuries. Hundreds of surrounding structures were damaged.

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) found that this was not simply a single-component failure. The incident developed through a chain of equipment, procedural, management-system, and emergency-response breakdowns. It is a powerful case study for any facility that stores or uses flammable gases—even when the process is not formally covered by OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) or EPA Risk Management Program (RMP) requirements.

What Caused the Watson Grinding Explosion?

According to the CSB, a degraded and poorly crimped rubber welding hose disconnected from its fitting inside a coating booth and released propylene. The manual shutoff valve at the bulk storage tank had not been closed at the end of the previous workday. At the same time, the automated gas-detection alarm, exhaust-fan startup, and gas shutoff system were inoperative.

Propylene accumulated inside the coating building overnight. When an employee entered the building and turned on the lights, the flammable vapor likely ignited and exploded.

The CSB also identified broader weaknesses: no comprehensive process safety management program, incomplete process safety information, no hazard assessment of the propylene process, no effective mechanical integrity program, no management of change review, and no written operating procedures. The emergency response plan did not address a propylene release, and employees were not trained to recognize and respond to that scenario.

Five Process Safety Lessons for Facilities Using Flammable Gases

1. Regulatory Coverage Is Not the Same as Hazard Control

The CSB determined that Watson Grinding’s propylene process was not covered by federal PSM or RMP requirements. The inventory was below the 10,000-pound threshold, and the propylene was being used as fuel. The underlying fire and explosion hazard still existed. Facilities should make a documented applicability determination and then use a risk-based process safety system appropriate to the actual hazard, even where a specific rule does not apply.

2. Manage Equipment Changes Before Startup

The hose involved in the release had been substituted for rigid tubing. Changes to hose material, fittings, piping configuration, operating limits, controls, or maintenance practices should be reviewed through a formal management of change process before the modified system is placed in service.

3. Treat Detection and Shutdown Systems as Safety-Critical

A gas detector is only one part of a protective function. A practical response to the CSB findings is to test the complete chain—from sensing and alarm to ventilation, isolation, shutdown, and operator response—at a defined frequency. Deficiencies should be tracked to verified closure.

4. Put Isolation and Shutdown Steps in Writing

Written procedures should clearly assign responsibility for end-of-day isolation, startup verification, abnormal conditions, and suspected leaks. Training and field verification help ensure that a safeguard remains part of routine practice.

5. Train Workers to Evacuate and Escalate

When a flammable gas release is suspected, the response plan should establish who orders evacuation, how access is controlled, how emergency responders are notified, and which actions employees must not attempt. OSHA’s emergency-action-plan requirements include procedures for reporting emergencies and evacuation; the CSB found these protections were missing or ineffective at Watson Grinding.

Questions to Include in Your Next Hazard Review

  • Could a hose, fitting, valve, or regulator release the full connected inventory?

  • What prevents continued flow after a downstream failure?

  • Are gas detection, ventilation, alarms, and automatic isolation independently tested?

  • What happens if one or more safeguards are unavailable?

  • Do startup and shutdown procedures address every manual isolation point?

  • Would every worker know to evacuate, restrict entry, and call emergency responders?

  • Are process changes reviewed through management of change before startup?

Official Sources and Further Reading

 
 
 

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